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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the implications of a recent agrarian reform 
programme in the Philippines for multinational corporate (MNC) plantations. 
Its central purpose is to assess and explain the land tenure consequences of the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme as it applied to MNC plantations. 
This entails an examination of the economic and political factors underlying 
both the passing of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme in 1988 
and its subsequent implementation on plantations. 
Though there is no coherent theory of land reform as it applies to MNC 
plantations two bodies of literature are very relevant: the political economy of 
land reform and the political economy of MNC expropriation in developing 
countries. These were drawn upon to provide general hypotheses that are tested 
in this study. These are that the relationship between the political and 
landowning elites of developing countries and the relationship between the 
political elites and the transnational economy are critical determinants of the 
political economy of land reform on MNC plantations. 
More specifically, in the context of the Philippine political economy, it is 
hypothesized that the close ties between the political and landowning elites, and 
their shared interests with, and ties to, MNCs, coupled with the economy's 
dependence on the corporations, has resulted in the agrarian reform programme 
bringing about no substantial change in MNt land tenure relations. 
In order to test these hypotheses, four multinational plantations in the 
Philippines that had been subject to land transfer under the agrarian reform 
programme were used as case studies. These were two pineapple plantations 
operated by subsidiaries of American-owned MNCs, Del Monte International 
and Castle and Cook International, and two oil palm plantations, one owned by 
an Indonesian corporation, Raja Garuda Mas, and the other by a Singaporean 
company, Keck Seng Private Ltd. 
It is found that the agrarian reform programme has not brought about any 
substantial change in MNC land tenure or production relations. This is in part 
attributed to the predominance of landed and agribusiness interests in the 
Philippines political economy, coupled with their shared interests with, and ties 
to, the MNCs. But it is also found that the MNCs, through their indirect lobby 
efforts, were able to influence decisively the consequences of the programme for 
their plantations. Finally, the MNCs' control over technology and markets, 
coupled with the substantial contribution of their plantations to employment and 
export earnings, ultimately constrained the degree of government intervention in 
their land tenure arrangements. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose and approach 
Over the last four decades there has been a global decline in the foreign 
ownership of plantation enterprises in developing countries (Graham, 1985:58; 
ILO, 1989:27; Christodoulou, 1990:168). This transfer of ownership and control 
has generally taken place within the context of land reform programmes or 
occurred in the form of separate acts of expropriation. The central purpose of 
this thesis is to explore the reasons for the application of land reform measures 
to multinational plantations and the consequences of this in terms of land tenure 
relations. 
The subjection of MNC plantations to land reform is partly explained in 
terms of political factors but these are not in themselves sufficient to explain 
why actors in the political process took the positions they did or why some had 
more influence than others. Herein lies the necessity of considering economic 
factors, which are essentially inseparable from the political. Of key importance 
with respect to the topic under investigation are the political economy of land 
reform and expropriation in developing countries. 
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In this chapter the political economy of land reform and expropriation are 
introduced and applied to the specific topic of multinational corporate 
plantations under land reform. Towards the end of the chapter, my choice of the 
Philippines and case study plantations to examine further this topic is explained. 
The historical evolution of the Philippine MNC plantation sector is described in 
Chapter Two, with particular attention being paid to political economic aspects. 
Chapter Three introduces the political economy of past land reform programmes 
in the Philippines and explains why MNC plantations were not included within 
their scope. From the analysis in these first three chapters several hypotheses 
are derived, which are stipulated at the end of this chapter. 
In Chapter Four, the land tenure consequences of the establishment of 
MNC plantations is explored, with the focus being on the case study plantations. 
Chapter Five introduces the broad political economic background to the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme of 1988 and then examines the 
framing of the law, especially those provisions that pertain to MNC plantations. 
The implementation of CARP on the case study plantations, including the 
framing of implementation policy and the establishment of land cooperatives, is 
covered in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven then considers the process and outcome 
of lease negotiations between the MNCs and new land cooperatives, and the 
reasons for and implications of DAR intervention in these negotiations. In 
Chapter Eight, ongoing CARP issues on the MNC plantations are identified and 
their short and long term land tenure consequences are assessed. Chapter Nine 
summaries this thesis and presents overall conclusions. 
Land reform and multinational corporate plantation defined 
According to Domer (1972:17), systems ofland tenure embody the: 
legal and contractual or customary arrangements whereby people in 
farming gain access to productive opportunities on the land. It 
constitutes the rules and procedures governing the rights, duties, 
liberties and exposures of individuals and groups in the use and 
control over the basic resources of land and water. 
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Land reform is essentially direct, government-induced change to the 
above-mentioned rules and procedures that pertain to landownership and control. 
Land reform more broadly defined, and hereafter referred to as agrarian reform, 
also encompassess changes in support services pertaining to production on the 
land: agricultural credit, marketing, research and extension, input supply, and 
processing and storage (Dorner, 1972: 19). Hereinafter land reform as used 
pertains to the more narrow definition, and agrarian reform to the broader 
definition. As this thesis is primarily concerned with changes in land tenure 
relations, its focus is on land reform per se. 
For the purpose of this thesis, 'plantation' is used in the sense of a: 
large farm estate producing a crop (or crops) for commercial 
purposes and employing a relatively large number of hired wage 
laborers organized under a central management (Hayami et al., 
1990:9). 
This production arrangement has two distinguishing characteristics: the 
centralization of usufruct and proprietary rights over plantation lands, and the 
predominant use of waged labour. Thus smallholder estates, which employ 
predominantly family labour, and haciendas and other estates that operate under 
tenancy or sharecropping arrangements are outside the scope of plantation, as 
defined. Other defining characteristics that have been attributed to plantations 
include: a high degree of specialization in the production of export and/or 
'tropical' or 'subtropical' crops; relatively high capital-labour/land ratios; and a 
relatively highly-skilled labour force (Courtenay, 1980:10; Pryor, 1982:289-
291). Such definitions are generally applicable to the case of the multinational 
corporate (MNC) plantation. 
'Multinational corporate' plantation, as used in this thesis, refers to those 
plantation enterprises in which a foreign owned and registered corporation 
enjoys a substantial, if not predominant, shareholding position. 'Multinational 
corporate -affiliated' corporation refers to the case in which a foreign 
corporation has no substantial shareholding position in the plantation enterprise, 
but has effective control over it or a claim to its produce by virtue of, for 
example, management and marketing contracts. 
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The ideology of land reform 
Contemporary land reform orthodoxy has its origins in classical political 
economy. Classical economists such as Adam Smith, Ricardo and John Stewart 
Mill addressed land tenure issues in their works. Whilst they perceived large-
scale or absentee landownership and servile rentals as an impediment to 
economic progress, they did not favour undue political interference in the 
institution of private property in land (El-Ghonemy, 1990:44-46; King, 1977 :33-
34). Within American agrarian thought of the late 19th century, family-sized 
farms in particular were represented as being an essential prerequisiste to a 
market economy and political democracy (El-Ghonemy, 1990:56). Associated 
with this was the 'agricultural ladder' concept, whereby agricultural labourers, 
through their hard work, could become solvent landowners (King, 1977:33; Tai, 
1974:18). 
As with some classical economists but for quite different reasons, Marx 
perceived the prevailing contemporary agrarian structure of large estates and the 
institution of tenancy as being a barrier to progress. He perceived the 
inevitability of agrarian reform in the context of the historical and essentially 
progressive transition from feudalism to capitalism (Lehmann, 1978:339). This 
progression was hastened by the inherent contradictions of feudalism, which 
manifested itself in rural areas in the form of peasant unrest. 
During the late 1940's and 1950's, 'development economics' arose as a 
distinct academic discipline. The new discipline was created by economists and 
social scientists, including those associated with the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (Lehmann, 1978:339), who sought to identify 
and address the particular economic problems of less developed countries. In a 
significant departure from classical economics, the new discipline emphasized 
the need for development planning and assigned governments active roles in 
economic management. The intellectual underpinnings of development 
economics were in part based upon the works of John Keynes (1934) and Michal 
Kalecki (1954), which provided the intellectual rationale for greater public 
expenditures and an enhanced role for governments in economic management 
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(El-Ghonemy, 1990:48-50). To the extent that classical propositions were 
present in these works and ECLA' s philosophy, they influenced the new 
discipline. 
Within the emerging discipline of development economics, the highly 
skewed distribution of landownership that existed in many countries was viewed 
as being an impediment to both the alleviation of poverty and the achievement of 
higher agricultural productivity (Domer, 1972: 19). Land reform was prescribed 
as the solution. Lehmann (1978:339-340) identifies two major strands of 
contemporary land reform orthodoxy: 'structuralist' and 'neoclassical'. The 
'structuralist' approach originated in Latin America and, although primarily 
concerned with social justice, its advocates couch their arguments in economic 
terms in order to attract the support of policymakers. In contrast, 'neoclassical' 
land reform is unabashedly economic, viewing the institution of tenancy and the 
highly skewed distribution of land and capital as a non-optimal allocation of 
resources. However, it should be noted that many neoclassical economists have 
been against agrarian reform, principally for the same reasons that their classical 
forebearers were: it entailed government interference in the market place and in 
private property rights (Lehmann, 1978:339-340). 
The policy prescriptions that flow from both approaches to land reform are 
similar: the redistribution of land in ownership and control to tenants, 
sharecroppers and landless farmers. From early post-war experience with land 
reform, the need to complement changes in land tenure with changes in 
agricultural support services became apparent and thus a broader strategy, or 
agrarian reform, was conceived. In the context of general development theory, 
the 'neoclassical' strand of land reform is most clearly related to modernization 
theory because it implies the need to replace 'traditional' patterns of land tenure 
and associated socio-cultural attitudes with family owned and operated farms 
and 'modernizing' values of the west (Griffith-Jones, 1979:425-426). An 
invariable consequence of land reform theories' focus on the case of the small-
farmer and 'traditional' forms of land tenure has been its lack of extension to the 
case of the multinational plantation. 
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The international political economy of land reform 
In the post-war period there has been a rapid proliferation of land reform 
programmes in most of the developing world but especially in Asia and Latin 
America. One of the principal reasons for the widespread adoption of land 
reform programmes by developing countries has been its worldwide promotion 
by influential actors in the international political economy, including the United 
States, the United Nations, FAO and the World Bank. This international support 
has made it 'virtually unfashionable for a developing country to refrain from 
adopting some measure of reform' (Tai, 1974:53). Underpinning this support 
was the intellectual shift in favour of redistributive measures, a shift that came in 
the context of the emerging school of development economics, but drew heavily 
from neoclassical propositions and was congruent with American agrarian 
thought and ideology. 
The United States 
During its post-war occupation of Japan and South Korea, in South 
Vietnam during the 1950's and in Latin American under the ageis of the 
Alliance for Progress in the early 1960's, the United States government gave 
substantial political support for the implementation of land reform programmes 
(Montgomery, 1984:117-118). The pre-emption of rural unrest and 
revolutionary tendencies among the rural masses of the Third World coupled 
with American liberal ideology and the associated concept of the family owned 
and operated farm, have been prime reasons for this support (Montgomery, 
1984:117-118). Land reform, or at least the rhetoric of land reform, was 
perceived to be a palliative for rural unrest because of its redistributive effects. 
Rural stability and non-revolutionary governments in tum created conditions 
conducive to American investors and exporters of manufactured goods. 
Because of the use of land reform as an instrument of counterinsurgency 
by the United States, the degree of its land reform advocacy in particular cases 
and at particular times has varied according to its perception of political stability. 
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This is exemplified in the case of its substantial technical advice and assistance 
and material aid for land reform in South Korea (Handelman, 1981:51-53), 
Taiwan (King, 1977:221-222) and South Vietnam (Tai, 1974:54) when the threat 
of a revolutionary change of government was perceived to be high. It is also 
evident in US political support for land reform in Latin America, via the 
Alliance for Progress, in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban revolution 
(Griffith-Jones, 1979:424-425; King, 1977:84-85) and in El Salvador following 
the 1979 Sandinista revolution in neighbouring Nicaragua (Deere, 1982:5-6; 
Montgomery, 1984:116). 
The threat of radical political change has been a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for substantive American support for land reform. Under 
the Alliance for Progress, for example, the United States never made land reform 
a condition of major aid lending to Latin American countries but instead tacitly 
supported military takeovers as a means to ensure political stability 
(Montgomery, 1984: 122-123). The new military regimes often did not prioritize 
land reform but were able to avail themselves of continuing US aid as long as 
· they adhered to the economic strategy that was advocated by the IMF 
(Montgomery, 1984:122-123). Complementing this approach has been 
USAID's takeover since the 1960's by conservative economic planners, with a 
greater interest in macroeconomic theories than institutional considerations, and 
the State Department's ongoing concern for the promotion and protection of US 
commercial interests in developing countries (Montgomery, 1984:124-127). 
Thus there remained a large gap between United States advocacy of land reform 
and its relative level of funding of such activities (King, 1974:47). 
Since the early 1980' s, there has been a discernible shift in the US policy 
position on land reform, away from government intervention in private property 
rights and towards allowing the market mechanism to regulate land distribution 
(El-Ghonemy, 1990:58-59). This change reflected the new market-orientated 
economic strategies of conservative governments in major industrialized 
countries. 
Despite its general policy pronouncements in favour of land reform, the 
United States government has exhibited a decisive reluctance to support the 
application of such to multinational plantations in any context. This arises out of 
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its conflicting interests to protect and promote private American capital within 
developing countries. The potential for conflict between land reform and 
American corporate interests is exemplified by the Guatemala government's 
expropriation of United Fruit Corporation (UFC) land in 1953. The expropriated 
lands, then unused by the corporation, were placed under the newly declared 
land reform programme of the moderate Arbenz government (Melville, 
1971:61). In response, and with pressure from transnational corporate interests, 
the US government took overt and covert actions that resulted in the eventual 
ousting of Arbenz and the return of the lands expropriated from the UFC 
(Melville, 1971 :73-78). 
Several legislative measures passed by the US Congress in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, which reflected the influence of MNCs, have threatened the 
curtailment of US bilateral assistance, support for multilateral assistance, trade 
preferences and export credits in the event that a nationalizing country has not 
taken what is deemed to be appropriate action on compensation (Sigmund, 
1980:7-10). These measures have been rarely invoked, in part because the legal 
threat of US sanctions has either deterred nationalization or persuaded the 
national governments to settle, swiftly and fairly, the compensation issue 
(Sigmund, 1980:331). An example of the deterent effects of the sanctions is the 
threatened application of legislative sanctions against a moderate government in 
Nicaragua in 1962 when it proposed a land reform programme that could have 
included UFC plantation lands (Bergsten et al., 1978:389). 
Another factor accounting for the limited application of the legislative 
measures has been the State Department's overriding concern with broader 
political, security and economic relations rather than protecting the property of 
particular MNCs (Sigmund, 1980:331; Poynter, 1985:62). The implementation 
of legislative sanctions could have endangered these broader interests, as well as 
thwarting a favourable settlement, from the corporation's perspective, of the 
specific dispute at hand. Even MNCs have become less inclined to lobby for the 
implementation of sanctions, in part because of the realization that public 
confrontation could be counterproductive to their interests (Sigmund, 1980:332; 
Moran, 1985: 15). 
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International agencies 
From the 1950' s major international organisations have advocated their 
support for, and given assistance to, land reform programmes although, unlike 
the United States, they have not played a catalytic role. The United Nations 
published its first major report on the issue in 1951 (King, 1977:46). Subsequent 
policy pronouncements of it and its allied organisations, in particular the FAQ, 
have consistently been in support of land and agrarian reform. The World Bank 
gave more attention to land reform during McNamara's presidency (1968-1981), 
publishing its first major policy paper on land reform in 1975. However there 
has been a gap between the level of importance that the United Nations, FAQ 
and the World Bank have assigned to land reform in terms of policy 
pronouncements and their relative level of funding of such activities (King, 
1977:47). World Bank funding of land reform programmes and associated 
projects was never substantial, even during the 1970' s (Powelson, 1984:94-95), 
and has recently declined in line with the reorientation of the economic 
strategies of the major industrialized countries (El-Ghonemy, 1990:60-63). 
As with the United States government, the international agencies have 
maintained somewhat contradictory policies with respect to land reform and 
MNC plantations. In the case of the World Bank, the contradiction arises from 
its promotion of land reform on the one hand, but its underlying support of a 
development model that prescibes unfettered and especially transnational capital 
flows into the agricultural sector on the other (Jacoby, 1978). The 'modern 
plantation' is perceived to be an efficient production arrangement that is able to 
stimulate capital formation, diffuse technologies and promote commercial crop 
production in the rural sector. Furthermore, through its dominant position in the 
World Bank, the US government has the potential to curtail bank lending to 
countries that have not paid adequate compensation for expropriated property 
(Sigmund, 1980:10). 
The World Bank and other institutions continue to finance the 
development of new large plantations in 'open resource' areas but now, in 
deference to nationalist pressure, joint venture arrangements are common or at 
least nominal provisions are made for the gradual indigenisation of plantations 
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over time (Graham, 1984:49). In both areas of new settlement and more 'closed 
resource' areas, the bank has increasingly promoted contract production 
arrangements between corporations and smallholders. These arrangements are 
perceived to have the same 'modernizing' advantages of the plantation mode but 
do not cause the displacement of small farmers or the institution of the dualistic 
agricultural structure that is usually associated with plantation development. 
The political economy of land reform 
The closeness of the relationship between political elites and landed elites 
is a prime determinant of the political economy of land reform (Tai, 1974:90-91; 
Christodoulou, 1990: 132-133). Across much of South Asia and Latin America, 
including in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile (post-
Allende ), landownership has remained intertwined with political power at both 
the local and national levels. Furthermore, the landed elites have frequently 
ventured into commercial agriculture and manufacturing and service industries. 
Thus, despite economic diversification within developing countries, large 
landowners, or those who can trace their origins to them, have established a 
predominance in the economic, as well as political, spheres. 
Despite their ongoing linkages to landownership, political elites in these 
countries have often been compelled to take land reform measures by the threat 
of the loss of political legitimacy or radical change (Tai, 1974:56). Government 
action on land reform has frequently been prompted by rural violence and 
organised rebellion, itself a manifestation of mass discontent with agrarian 
conditions. In the case of 'democratic governments', extra-legislature and 
radical opposition is symptomatic of the failure of elite-dominated electoral and 
party systems to translate popular demands into government policy. The 
relationship between rural unrest and land reform is exemplified in the case of 
Colombia's 1961 reform (Tai, 1974:69-75); Chile under Christian Democratic 
rule during the 1960's (Castillo and Lehmann, 1983:249-254); the pre-1969 
Peruvian reforms (Kay, 1983:204-205) and the introduction of the 1972 land 
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reform law in Sri Lanka (Christodoulou, 1990: 129). Land reform measures that 
have been introduced by political systems still intertwined with landownership 
and with the purpose of pre-empting or quelling rural unrest have usually been 
weak. Limited scope, high private land retention limits, generous landowner 
compensation and multiple loopholes characterise such reform measures. 
In other developing countries however, the ties between landownership 
and political and economic power have been considerably weakened or even 
severed: in Japan and South Korea during the American occupation; in Taiwan 
by the assumption of the mainland Kuomintang forces to power (1949); in India 
and Chile (1969-71) through the electoral success of mass-based parties; in 
Egypt (1952) and Peru (1969) by military coup d'etat; and in Cuba (1959), 
Vietnam (1954), China (1949) and Nicaragua (1979) by a revolutionary change 
of government. As in the case of those governments with collaborative ties with 
the landowning elite, these regimes have introduced land reform primarily to 
elicit political support (Tai, 1974:56). In contrast to them, however, such 
measures they have introduced have been of more substance, primarily because 
of their tenuous links with, or even antagonistic attitudes towards landowners. 
The political economy of expropriation 
The extension of land reform to foreign-owned plantations constitutes an 
act of expropriation. This issue has been extensively treated in the literature 
within several different contexts. Members of the Marxist dependencia school 
perceive MNCs to have asymmetrical power over host countries, and the ability 
to mould the internal political economy of such in a way that promotes their own 
interests and preserves their own dominance indefinitely (Moran, 1974:7). In 
this analysis, MNCs exert strong influence over host country policies via 
alliances with local political elites. More recently, the bargaining power 
approach has dominated the literature on multinationals. This perceives the 
power relations between host countries and multinationals in dynamic terms and 
predicts their evolution in favour of host countries over time (Bergsten et al., 
1978:369-381; Moran, 1985:6). 
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In the post-war period many developing countries have taken measures to 
nationalize foreign-owned corporations, especially those engaged in the use or 
exploitation of natural resources. The peak period of nationalizations occured 
from the 1960's to mid-1970's, and coincided with the gaining of independence 
(Kolbrin, 1982:36). The phenomenon of nationalization has been most visible 
and complete in countries in which revolutionary or anti-colonial elites have 
assumed power, such as in Cuba, Vietnam, Tanzania and Peru (Kobrin, 
1982:36). In these countries nationalizations have been effected by governments 
in order to gain popularity and as part of broadly-based programmes aimed at 
asserting national sovereignity over natural resoures and the economy. 
Nationalization has also been a significant phenomenon in countries in 
which there has not been a drastic break with external powers or revolutionary 
change of government, as in the case of Venezuela and Chile (Frei period). 
Political elites have used nationalization as a means of earning nationalist 
credentials and thus gaining political legitimacy and popular support (Moran, 
1985:15; Poynter, 1985:27). But governments have have also expropriated 
foreign-owned assets for decisively economic reasons: to establish control over 
and capture the surplus generated by key economic activities (Fortin, 1978:22-
23; Sigmund, 1980:260). Such nationalization both reflected and reinforced the 
increasingly direct economic role of developing states during the 1960' s and 
1970's. 
However, the total number of nationalizations relative to the total number 
of operations of multinationals within developing countries has remained small, 
at about 5% (Kobrin, 1982:13). Particularly after the mid-1970's there has been 
a marked drop in the number of expropriations. Several arguments related to the 
bargaining-power school have been used to explain this: the nationalization of 
many large-scale mining and petroleum production operations and the increased 
technical and managerial capabilities of host nations, which have allowed them 
to capture the benefits of direct foreign investment via increasing state regulation 
as opposed to nationalization (Kolbrin, 1982:38; Kennedy, 1992:79-81). 
Furthermore, the increasing adoption of joint venture, contractual and other 
indirect production arrangments by MNCs (Sigmund, 1980:332) have minimized 
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the risk of nationalization through lowering the visibility of the foreign 
corporation and creating a domestic lobby in favour of non-intervention (Moran, 
1985:15). 
Other potential explanations for the decline in expropriation imply a 
limitation in host government bargaining power and lean more towards the 
dependencia school. On a general level, changes in the international political 
economy over the last decade have accentuated the need of developing countries 
to generate export earnings and employment. This, coupled with the MNCs' 
continuing importance as suppliers of production technology, capital and 
markets, have caused developing countries to adopt policies that encourage 
foreign investment, not divestment, and privatization, not increasing state 
control (Kolbrin, 1982:38; Minor, 1988:54-55). MNC bargaining power has 
been particularly strong in the case of those industries or corporations that are 
characterised by a high degree of operational and managerial complexity, the 
vertical integration of production and marketing processes and a large proportion 
of export sales (Poynter, 1985:45-50). 
The political economy of land reform on 
multinational corporate plantations 
There are generally two ways in which MNC plantations have been 
subjected to land reform: through inclusi0~1 within the scope of an explicit land 
reform programme or as a specific act of expropriation. These are not mutually 
exclusive. Thus a political elite's relationship with both domestic landowning 
and foreign corporate interests are crucial to an understanding of land reform on 
MNC plantations. Where both of these have been weakened by a drastic change 
in government, as in the assumption of power by anti-colonial revolutionary 
elites in Mozambique, Angola and Cuba, foreign owned plantations and estates 
have usually been expropriated without compensation (Christodoulou, 1990: 173; 
ILO, 1989:16). Broad land reform and nationalization measures enacted in Peru 
in 1969, which included within their scope American-owned sugar plantations, 
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followed the ascendancy to power of nationalist middle-ranking military officers 
who had little association with the landed elite. These measures were part of the 
new regime's attempt to secure political legitimacy, as well as a comprehensive 
restructuring of the economy (Kay, 1982:206). The compensation issue was 
only resolved after a lengthy confrontation. 
Even those countries in which domestic political elites have continued to 
have close ties to both the landed elite and the dominant plantation-owning 
foreign power, nationalism and land reformism have generated pressures for 
change. This is especially so where the political elite used nationalism for 
political legitimacy purposes, and where large foreign-owned plantations existed 
amidst acute landlessness and rural poverty (Christodoulou, 1990:167). The 
usual government response in this situation has been to expropriate the 
plantations with compensation, as in the cases of the nationalization of sugar 
plantations in Guyana (Thomas, 1979:224) and Jamaica (ILO, 1989:16). In Sri 
Lanka, a broad land reform measure was enacted in 1972 by a moderate 
government in response to the rise of a rural insurgency group. Though 
implicitly encompassing the large, predominantly foreign-owned tea estate 
sector, it was not until 1975 that the government implemented the reform in this 
sector (ILO, 1989:14; Christodoulou, 1990:173). 
In other countries economic nationalism has been the predominant factor 
accounting for the reform of multinational plantations. This represents an 
attempt by governments, or private nationals, to gain a greater share of the 
surplus generated by plantation enterprise. Examples include the goverment-
decreed indigenisation of the majority shareholdings of foreign plantations in 
Nigeria and Ghana (Graham, 1984:50) and the Indonesian state's buyout of a 
majority shareholding of large plantations on Sumatra (ILO, 1989: 13). In the 
case of Malaysia, the government's facilitation of the private indigenisation of 
foreign-owned rubber and oil palm plantations took place within the context of 
its New Economic Policy, a broad strategy to alleviate poverty and restructure 
the ownership of industry in response to ethnic riots in 1969 (Pletcher, 
1991:630). 
15 
Recent plantation development in developing countries has typically taken 
the form of joint-ventures (Christdoulou, 1990:168). However, there has been a 
policy reversal by some governments, including Tanzania and Indonesia, which 
have relaxed restrictions on foreign plantation ownership and control in order to 
address balance of payments problems and increase agricultural productivity 
(ILO, 1989:10). 
The land tenure consequences of land reform 
on multinational corporate plantations 
When subjected to land reform, plantations have usually not been 
subdivided but instead transferred intact to state, cooperative or national 
corporate ownership (ILO, 1989:27). Governments' concern for maintaining 
economies of scale in production and, in the case of socialist states, the 
· promotion of collective farming endeavours, appear to be factors that account 
for this. A related explanation is that multinational plantation workers, because 
of their relatively higher work reimbursements and socialization into waged 
labour, neither agitate nor opt for the parcellation of plantation lands. This 
seems to be a factor behind Peruvian sugar workers' support for the maintenance 
of a plantation system since the country's 1969 land reform programme (Horton, 
1975:236-237). In contrast, other production cooperatives that were formed out 
of a non-proletarised workforce that had a prior attachment to specific parcels of 
land, and in which economies of scale were not evident, had a poor performance 
record and have recently disintegrated (Melmed-Sanjak and Carter, 1988?:190-
192) Cuban sugar estate workers were likewise in favour of the maintenance of 
the plantation arrangement and their worker status (Christodoulou, 1990:75). 
With respect to the organisational aspect of collective farming, production 
cooperatives that were created through government intervention and a 'top-
down' approach have often failed to elicit the members' enthusiasm and support, 
or promote autonomous initiative and development (Whyte, 1985:165). 
Furthermore: 
Rarely if ever are successful cooperatives organised with members 
who previously have had nothing to do with each other. However, 
the problems of reshaping the former relations among members are 
especially difficult if the cooperatives are built out of pre-existing 
and strongly entrenched organisational structures (Whyte, 
1985:161-162). 
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Whyte cites, among others, the case of the cooperatives set up on sugar 
plantations in Peru under the 1969 agrarian reform law. The plantation unions, 
noted for their militancy, assumed control over the cooperatives despite the 
government envisaging their 'fading away' under the reform programme. One 
consequence of this has been the exclusion of seasonal workers, never covered 
under union-bargained labour contracts, from becoming members of the 
plantation cooperatives (Whyte, 1985:162). 
The transfer in ownership of foreign plantations to state agencies, 
cooperatives or national corporations, has had little impact on land tenure or 
employment patterns (ILO, 1989:27). In part this has been because of the 
continued maintenance of central management systems and large scale 
production methods. One author goes as far as to argue that: 
No matter who the owners are ... the policies required for high 
productivity and maximum production will be the same in the long 
term. Indeed, the options for plantation owners are much more 
limited than is sometimes imagined (Graham, 1984:51). 
However, the setting and attainment of other objectives within the plantation 
framework is possible. This is best exemplified by the case of nationalised sugar 
plantations in Cuba, which provided regular employment to former seasonal 
workers through diversification into food crop production and tackled 
consequential seasonal labour shortages through the mechanization of sugar 
harvesting operations (ILO, 1989:27). State ownership and the high political 
priority accorded to equity objectives appear to be the determining factors in this 
case. 
Land reform has, on a more general level, made wholly foreign-owned 
plantations in developing countries an increasingly rare phenomenon (Graham, 
1985:58; ILO, 1989:27; Christodoulou, 1990:168). However, the 
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high degree of local ownership of productive facilities has not 
significantly reduced the dependence of host countries on MNCs for 
access to technology, markets and distribution channels. In 
particular, the marketing of agricultural products remains, to a very 
significant degree, under MNC control (Zorn, 1985:45). 
Three US-based MNCs continue to control the bulk of international trade in 
bananas (Zorn, 1985:45). Traditionally sourcing their fruits from their own 
plantations, from the 1960's the MNCs increasingly utilised associate producer 
arrangements (Read, 1986:329). Under such arrangements, they offered 
managerial and technical expertise to local growers in return for an exclusive 
claim to their output. Whilst host government policies in part induced this 
change, the new arrangements suited MNCs because they shifted production 
risks and labour management responsibilities onto the local producer and at the 
same time minimised the possibility of nationalization. Furthermore, under the 
new arrangements they were still able to enjoy the advantages of the vertical 
integration of production, processing and marketing. 
A similar level of MNC control is evident in the pineapple industry, with 
just two US-based firms producing and marketing some 40% of world pineapple 
production (Harman, 1984:35). A high degree of raw pineapple is sourced from 
corporate-owned plantations, although there has been a limited adoption of 
associate producer schemes by the dominant MNCs. Whilst coffee, tobacco, 
cotton and sugar plantations have largely passed into the control of nationals or 
national corporations, the MNCs still have significant, if not predominant, 
control over the international marketing of these commodities (Zorn, 1985:45). 
The continuing domination of downstream activities by MNCs has limited 
the potential implications of land reform on MNC plantations. In Guyana, the 
government expropriated two enormous sugar plantations at a negotiated price, 
but then entered back into management and marketing contracts with one of the 
original foreign corporations. With respect to this 'reform', one author asserts 
that: 
If nationalisation remains unaccompanied by equally fundamental 
changes in other areas of state policy, it will degenerate into a 
simple juridical modification of the existing plantation structure 
(Thomas, 1979:226-227). 
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Even in the case of the sugar plantations of Cuba, which severed even their 
marketing ties with MNCs, some dependency theorists perceive an essential 
continuity in the form of Cuba's dependency on a new metropolitan country, the 
Soviet Union (Beckford, 1972:218-220). This view has been criticised on the 
grounds that there has been no realistic alternative to revolutionary Cuba's 
reliance on the sugar industry and that it has had a positive developmental 
impact (Pollitt, 1986:195-230). It is evident that the success, however defined, of 
reformed plantations, is affected by prices determined by the international price 
movements and marketing arrangments that may, through MNC monopoly 
power, be beyond the scope of national government intervention. 
Choice of the Philippines and case studies 
The Philippines was chosen as a country in which to study land reform on 
multinational plantations because of the passing by it of a major agrarian reform 
measure, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) of 1988 and 
its hosting of MNC-owned and operated plantations. The MNC plantations were 
implicitly included within the scope of the new Philippine land reform law by 
virtue of its coverage of all agricultural lands regardless of land tenure 
arrangment or commodity produced. 
MNC planatations in the Philippines were located within four major 
export industries: pineapple, banana, oil palm and rubber. However, CARP was 
discriminatory in its application to MNC plantations in terms of both land tenure 
arrangements and commodity produced. The MNC pineapple and oil palm 
plantations were to be immediately subject to land transfer by virtue of their 
lease of public lands. In contrast, both MNC and domestically-owned banana 
and rubber plantations were eligible to apply for a 10-year deferment from land 
reform on the basis of crop type. All the banana plantations subsequently 
applied for and were granted this deferment. Although land reform was 
undertaken on several of the MNC rubber plantations, these were located in a 
politically unstable area and this rendered them difficult to study. Thus, by a 
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process of elimination, the causes and consequences of land reform on the MNC 
pineapple and oil palm plantations became my specific thesis topic. There were 
two of each type in the Philippines. All of them were located on the southern 
island of Mindanao and all were adopted as case studies. 
Del Monte Philippines, Incorporated pineapple plantation 
This plantation, established in 1928, is located in Bukidnon province. The 
plantation enterprise is one of the largest of its kind in the world, covering a total 
of 19,000 hectares and maintaining a regular labour force of nearly 6,000 
persons. Raw pineapple is trucked to DMPI' s cannery and port complex at 
Bugo, in neighbouring Misamis Occidental province, for processing and then 
export to major markets in Europe, Japan, and the United States. The cannery 
employs over 3,000 regular workers. 
Del Monte Philippines, Incorporated (DMPI) was, until very recently, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of of an American-based MNC, Del Monte 
International, formerly the California Packing Corporation (CALP AK). 
CALP AK was formed in 1916 as result of the merger of the four largest fruit 
companies in California (IDOC, 1973:36). Although establishing pineapple 
plantations and canneries in the Hawaiian Islands, the scarcity of suitable lands, 
high land rentals and an epidemic of plant diseases contributed toward the 
corporation's search abroad for a more ideal location (Colayco, 1987:10). 
Whilst technical factors endeared Bukidnon to the corporation, political factors 
including its ability to overcome restrictive land laws (see Chapter Two). 
In the post-war period, Del Monte International emerged as a major MNC 
in the food processing business. By 1975 it owned and operated seven large 
plantations (including two pineapple plantations in Hawaii and one in Kenya) 
and 47 canneries and dried-fruit plants (Swainson, 1980:161). In 1984 it, along 
with Castle and Cook International (see below), produced some 40% of the 
world's canned pineapple (Harman, 1984:35). Del Monte International is also 
one of the 'big three' that dominate international banana trading (Zorn, 
20 
1985:45), maintaining plantations in Guatemala, Costa Rica and, via contract 
growing arrangements, the Philippines (Swainson, 1980:161). Del Monte 
products are marketed via its own global distribution network. 
In 1979 Del Monte International was brought out by RJR Industries, Inc., 
which subsequently merged with Nabisco Brands in 1985 to form the 19th 
largest corporation in the United States (Atienza, 1992:11). Then in December 
1988 RJR-Nabisco, Inc., was taken over by Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts, a New 
York-based partnership that specialized in debt-financed takeovers (Stafford and 
Purkis, 1989(1):1088). Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts subsequently sold most of Del 
Monte International' s processed foods business, including the Del Monte 
Philippines, Inc. pineapple plantation, to a consortium of Japanese and American 
corporations (Merrill Lynch and Co., Citicorp Capital Investors, Kikkoman 
Corporation) and members of Del Monte management (Atienza, 1992: 11-12). 
Dole Philippines, Incorporated pineapple plantation 
This plantation, established in 1963, is located in the province of South 
Cotabato. It presently covers some 12,000 hectares and, along with its 
associated cannery complex, employs over 6,000 regular workers. The 
plantation's produce is exported via the corporation's private port complex in 
General Santos city. 
Dole Philippines, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Castle and Cook 
International. Castle and Cook was originally founded as a partnership in 
Hawaii in 1851 and incorporated in 1894. Initially involved in the mercantile 
and shipping business, it diversified into sugar production in 1858 and then 
pineapple in 1902 (Mirabile, 1990:490-491). Castle and Cook International 
continued to expand and diversify in the post-war period, adding to its activities 
real estate development in 1958, seafood processing in 1961 and fresh bananas 
in 1964, via its takeover of the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company of New 
Orleans (Mirabile, 1990:491). Its decision to invest in pineapple in the 
Philippines in 1963 was part of its overall strategy of increasing its European 
market share coupled with its effort to surmount unfavourable labour and land 
costs in Hawaii (IDOC, 1973:40-42). 
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Castle and Cook now ranks as the world's largest producer and marketer 
of fresh fruits and vegetables (Stafford and Purkis, 1989(1):256), largest 
marketer of pineapple and second to largest distributor of bananas (Mirable, 
1990:492). In addition to the Philippines, it has a pineapple plantation in each of 
Hawaii, Honduras and Thailand and sources its bananas, under various contract 
production and marketing arrangements, from Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
and Colombia (Stafford and Purkis, 1989:256). 
NOC-Guthrie oil palm plantation 
This plantation, developed from 1980, encompasses 8,000 hectares in 
Agusan del Sur province. The enterprise, including the oil palm mill, has a 
regular workforce of some 1,400. Because of the different sources of finance 
raised during the project's development, it has been incorporated as two 4,000 
hectare plantations: NOC-Guthrie Plantations, Incorporated (NGPI) and NDC-
Guthrie Estates, Incorporated (NOEi) (Hontiveros et al., 1988:12-13). NGPI, 
incorporated in 1980, obtained a loan from the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, the British government's concessional development finance 
institution. NOEi, incorporated in 1982, availed itself of a loan from the 
International Finance Corporation, the private lending arm of the World Bank. 
Separated from each other only by a national highway, they are both owned and 
managed by the same venture. 
NDC-Guthrie is a nominal 60:40 joint venture between the National 
Development Company (NDC), a Philippine state holding company, and foreign 
investors 1. The original foreign investor in the project was Guthrie Overseas 
Holdings, Incorporated, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the British-based Guthrie 
Corporation. Guthrie Corporation had large oil palm and rubber plantations in 
Malaysia and other countries. But in 1981 NDC-Guthrie's foreign shareholding 
changed as an offshoot of the Malaysian state's takeover of a majority 
shareholding in Guthrie Corporation via its government's holding company, the 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB)2. The foreign shareholdings in NDC-
Guthrie were consequently transferred to a wholly-owned subsidiary of PNB, 
Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad (KGB). By the mid-1980' s, the PNB controlled all 
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the major plantation companies in Malaysia (Pletcher, 1991:630), but simply 
functioned as a holding company for private Malay capital and played no active 
role in their running3. 
Over 1989-91, Raja Garuda Mas., a private Indonesian corporation, 
purchased KGB' s share in the project. RGM is controlled by an Indonesian 
Chinese family and has widely diversified interests in timber and paper mills, 
construction, plantations and in other fields4. KGB's decision to invest in the 
financially-troubled NOC-Guthrie project appears to have been made largely on 
political rather than financial grounds5. 
Agusan Plantations, Incorporated oil palm plantation 
This plantation, established in 1982, is also in Agusan del Sur province. It 
is approximately 2,300 hectares in size and employs over 200 regular workers. 
It is owned by Agusan Plantations, Incorporated (API) is a 50:10:40 joint 
venture between private Filipino Chinese investors, the previously-mentioned 
National Development Corporation (NDC), and Keck Seng Private, Limited, a 
Singapore-registered private company6. The Filipino Chinese investors are led 
by Leonardo Ty, who also owns the large Manila Paper Mills, located in the 
same region (Hawes, 1986:119). The Singaporean partner, Keck Seng Private, 
Limited, has as its registered shareholders two family companies and four 
individuals, all Singaporean 7. Its principle activities are described as 'holding 
companies' and 'general importers and exporters'. The companies paid-up 
capital in the API venture far exceeds that of the venture' s other partners8. 
Hypotheses 
On the basis of the review of land reform on MNC plantations above, and 
the review of the Philippine political economy in Chapters Two and Three, the 
following hypotheses are developed. 
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1. That land reform was introduced by the Aquino government and extended 
to the MNC plantations because of land reformist and nationalist pressures. 
It represented an attempt by the Philippine government to gain political 
legitimacy. 
2. That the agrarian reform law as it applies to and has been implemented on 
the MNC plantations is not a true land reform measure. 
3. That this is the result of: 
3.1 the predominance of local landowning and agribusiness interests 
within the Philippine political economy, and their shared interests 
with and ties to MNCs; 
3.2 the dependency of the Philippine economy on the export earnings and 
employment generated by the MNC plantations, and 
3.3 the dependency of the Philippine economy on MNC capital, 
technology and distribution channels, both generally and in the 
specific case of the MNC plantations. 
Notes 
1 Securities and Exchange Commission, Metro Manila, 1991. General 
Information Sheets (NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Incorporated and NDC-
Guthrie Estates, Incorporated). 
2 Far Eastern Economic Review 19 November, 1982:60. 
3 Far Eastern Economic Review 19 November, 1982:60. 
4 Personal correspondence with Amit Guha, Agricultural Research and 
Advisory Bureau, Kajang, Selangor, Malaysia, 5 January 1993. It has 
been rumoured that ROM recently was forced to 'cross-link' its 
shareholdings with Indonesia's largest business conglomerate, the Salim 
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Group. This is controlled by Liem Sioe Liong, a leading Indonesian 
Chinese businessman and close associate of President Suharto. 
5 Personal interview with NOC-Guthrie plantation manager, Mr David Das, 
NOC-Guthrie plantation, 29 July 1991. Mr Das would not elaborate on 
the political reasons behind RGM' s decision to invest but opinioned that 
RGM had chosen the 'wrong football', given the serious financial 
problems of the venture. 
6 Securities and Exchange Commission, Metro Manila, 1986. General 
Information Sheet (Agusan Plantations, Incorporated). 
7 Registry of Companies and Businesses, Singapore, 1992. Computer 
Information/Business Profile (Keck Seng (Singapore) Private Limited). 
8 Whereas Keck Seng has paid up all of its subscribed capital, the other 
shareholders have only paid half of their subscriptions (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Metro Manila, 1986. General Information Sheet 
(Agusan Plantations, Incorporated)). 
